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Abstract
An extension of the WHILE-language is developed for programming
game-theoretic mechanisms involving multiple agents. Examples of such
mechanisms include auctions, voting procedures, and negotiation proto-
cols. A structured operational semantics is provided in terms of extensive
games of almost perfect information. Hoare-style partial correctness asser-
tions are proposed to reason about the correctness of these mechanisms,
where correctness is interpreted as the existence of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Using an extensional approach to pre- and postconditions,
we show that an extension of Hoare’s original calculus is sound and com-
plete for reasoning about subgame-perfect equilibria in game-theoretic
mechanisms. We use the calculus to verify some simple mechanisms like
the Dutch auction.
1 Introduction
In recent years, games have become more prominent in different areas of com-
puter science research. The reason for this seems to be the realisation that
games form a natural generalisation of programs. This insight can be realised
on a number of different levels (we shall only mention two): On a foundational
level, games have been used to provide an alternative model of computation,
the alternating Turing machine [3]. At a more abstract level, program logics
like propositional dynamic logic have been extended to games [12].
From a game-theoretic perspective, much of this work is extremely narrow,
since it mainly focuses on determined 2-player win/loss games of perfect infor-
mation. On the other hand, game theory has developed a wealth of techniques
to study more complicated situations where agents interact, involving more than
two players, imperfect information, and preferences over outcomes which can-
not be captured by simply distinguishing between winning and losing. Still, it
has been suggested [13] that combining research in game theory and computer
1
science, we may be able to obtain a better understanding of social software, i.e.,
of the formal properties of the social processes we are involved in. The present
paper tries to contribute to this aim.
More concretely, we attempt to generalise techniques from formal program
verification to games or game-theoretic mechanisms such as auctions, voting pro-
cedures, etc. From a logical perspective, two approaches suggest themselves. On
the one hand, one might extend model checking approaches [4], where one uses,
for instance, temporal logic to specify properties of a system (program/game)
and proceeds to verify these properties using model checking. This approach
has been generalised to reason about coalitional power in games [14]. On the
other hand, one can try to extend approaches based on theorem proving using
a formal calculus in which one can derive certain properties of a system. This
approach will be taken here.
The axiomatic or compositional approach to program verification was intro-
duced by Hoare [7] and Dijkstra [5], and provided the foundation stone for formal
program verification [10, 1, 6]. In Hoare’s calculus, correctness assertions of the
form {P}pi{Q} are used to express that program pi, when executed in a state
satisfying P , will terminate in a state satisfying Q (provided it does terminate).
In generalising the program verification approach to games, this paper makes
two contributions: First, it defines a programming language which is a simple
extension of the WHILE-language sufficient to program game-theoretic mecha-
nisms. The syntax of this language is defined in section 2, and section 3 provides
a structured operational semantics in terms of extensive games of almost perfect
information. Second, we are going to extend Hoare’s calculus to reason about
the correctness of these mechanisms, where correctness is interpreted as the ex-
istence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium with a certain payoff. In section 4, we
define our new notion of correctness by providing a game-theoretic interpreta-
tion of {P}pi{Q}, also linking it to the game-theoretic notion of implementation
and mechanism design. Section 5 presents an extensional calculus for reasoning
about mechanism correctness, and provides proofs of soundness and complete-
ness. Finally, section 6 illustrates the calculus in the verification of a few simple
mechanisms.
2 Syntax of MPL
Our mechanism programming language (MPL) is a simple extension of standard
imperative programming languages; more concretely, our point of departure is
the well-knownWHILE-language (see e.g. [10]). We assume throughout that we
are given a nonempty set of agents or players Ags, a set of mechanism variables
MV , a set of function symbols Funs and a set of relation symbols Rels. Using
these, we inductively define terms t, boolean expressions B and mechanisms (or
game forms) γ as follows:
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t := x | fk(t1, . . . , tk)
B := true | Rk(t1, . . . , tk) | ¬B | B1 ∧B2
γ := x := t | γ1; γ2 | ifB then γ1 else γ2 | whileB do γ |
chA({xa|a ∈ A})
where a∈Ags, fk∈Funs is a k-ary function symbol (in case k = 0 we are dealing
with constants), Rk∈Rels a k-ary relation symbol, x, xa∈MV , and A ⊆ Ags is
finite and nonempty.
The last construct presents the only addition to the standard WHILE-
language: chA lets agent a ∈ A choose any value for the variable xa. The agents
in A are making their choice simultaneously, so in order to prevent conflicting
assignments to variables, we require all the xa to be distinct. One can think
of the chA construct as a strategic game among n agents, where the strategic
choice of an agent is represented by the value of his/her variable. While the set
of agents may be infinite, we require each chA construct to involve only finitely
many agents. In the special case where |A| = 1, we have a simple nondeter-
ministic choice. More concretely, in case agent 1 can choose between 2 different
strategies, executing γ1 vs. executing γ2, we can describe this situation as
ch{1}({x1}); if x1 = 0 then γ1 else γ2,
where we assume that the domain of computation is the set of natural numbers,
for instance, and = ∈ Rels and 0 ∈ Funs.
MPL is an extremely general programming language for a large variety of dif-
ferent kinds of mechanisms. In section 4 we shall use it for defining mechanisms
for different kinds of auctions. Voting procedures are further examples of mech-
anisms which can be programmed using MPL. As an example, the well-known
Borda-count procedure (see, e.g., [2]) can be programmed as follows:
chAgs({x1, x2, . . . , xN});
i := 1;
while i ≤ K do ci := 0; i := i+ 1;
a := 1;
while a ≤ N do
i := 1;
while i ≤ K do
ci := ci + xa[i];
i := i+ 1;
a := a+ 1
In this example, we assume that Ags = {1, 2, . . . , N}, and that the agents have
to choose among K candidates. First, each agent a can cast a ballot of the
form xa = (p1, p2, . . . , pK), where pi is the number of points the agent gives to
candidate i. Ballots have to be rankings of candidates, i.e., the most preferred
candidate must obtain K points, the next preferred candidate K − 1 points,
etc., so that the least-preferred candidate obtains 1 point. Hence, we assume
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implicitly that the domain of computation contains these possible ballots, and
that the initial choice assigns a ballot to each xa. (Note that since the domain of
computation will also contain the natural numbers, we need to make sure that
each xa is assigned to an element of the appropriate ballot type, but we shall
ignore this problem in order to keep the algorithm simple.) Once the ballots are
cast, a is initialised to the first agent, and i to the first candidate. The variable
ci counts the number of points accumulated by candidate i, and is initialised
to 0. The main part of the algorithm then simply sums up the points for each
candidate, where xa[i] refers to pi, in case xa = (p1, p2, . . . , pK). The winner of
the vote will be the candidate accumulating the most points.
A further example of a well-known mechanism which can be programmed in
MPL is a version of Rubinstein’s negotiation protocol of alternating offers (see
[11, 8]).
agree := false;
optout := false;
i := 1;
while ¬optout ∧ ¬agree do
if i = 1 then ch{1}({x})else ch{2}({x});
if i = 1 then ch{2}({y})else ch{1}({y});
if y = 0 then agree := true
else if y = 1 then optout := true else i := 3− i
For simplicity, we have assumed that there are only two agents who try to reach
an agreement over, e.g., the price of a car which agent 1 wants to sell to agent
2, and so we can assume the domain of computation to be simply the natural
numbers. The negotiation procedure can end in an agreement concerning the
price, one of the agents can opt out of the negotiation (in which case some
predetermined event will occur), or the negotiation can go on forever. The
protocol starts by agent 1 making a price offer x. Agent 2 responds by choosing
y, where we interpret y = 0 as signalling agreement to the price offered, y = 1 as
a decision to opt out of the negotiation, and any other value for y as signalling
the desire to make a counteroffer, upon which we get another iteration of the
loop with the roles reversed.
The above negotiation protocol is very general, and numerous instances of
it have been analysed game-theoretically [8]. We shall not go into this or the
voting mechanism in more detail, since our main aim at this point is only to
suggest the generality of the mechanism programming language defined. Section
6 will provide a more detailed and more formal treatment of examples such as
the ones given here. In the following section, we shall provide a formal semantics
for this language in terms of games. Furthermore, we will subsequently provide
a calculus for reasoning about the existence of game-theoretic equilibria in these
mechanisms, and about the payoffs the agents obtain in equilibrium.
Note that MPL only allows one to construct mechanisms with almost-perfect
information, i.e., agents are perfectly informed about all the choices made ex-
cept possibly for simultaneous moves. Different subclasses of MPL-mechanisms
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correspond to various natural assumptions regarding the power of the mecha-
nism designer and the agents in general. The class MPL(PRG) of programs is
the class of MPL-mechanisms which do not contain any chA construct. With-
out this construct, MPL is simply the WHILE-language. The class MPL(PI)
of perfect-information mechanisms will restrict the use of chA to cases where
|A| = 1, i.e., where all choices involve only a single agent. Perfect-information
mechanisms allow different agents to make choices at different times, but all
choices are public, there are no simultaneous moves.
3 Structured Operational Semantics via Games
The most detailed semantics we can provide for MPL expressions is a struc-
tured operational semantics which specifies the configurations a mechanism can
be in and the possible transitions between configurations. For programs, such
a semantics gives rise to an execution sequence or trace, and in case of nonde-
terministic programs to an execution tree. Since in the case of mechanisms we
are dealing with multiple agents, we arrive at a game tree whose positions are
the possible configurations of the mechanism.
As is standard in first-order logic, we will work with an interpretation I
which provides us with a domain DI and functions and relations over DI as
interpretations for the symbols in Funs and Rels. Furthermore, we assume that
besides the relations associated to symbols in Rels, our interpretation contains
an additional binary ≥Ia -relation for every agent a ∈ Ags. The ≥
I
a relation will
be used to represent agent a’s preference over the elements of the domain. Note
that mechanisms programmed in MPL cannot refer to these preferences, since
≥a 6∈ Rels.
The only requirements on I are that the preference relations ≥Ia⊆ DI ×
DI satisfy the following properties: (1) ≥Ia must be a partial pre-order, i.e.,
a reflexive and transitive relation on DI , and (2) there is a uniformly worst
outcome (which we denote as −∞), i.e., there is some d ∈ DI such that for all
a ∈ Ags and x ∈ DI we have x ≥Ia d. Usually, preference relations will be total
orders, but our framework does not require this. The uniformly worst outcome
is needed to deal with some infinite runs resulting from while-loops, it plays no
substantive role in any of the examples considered.
A state s : MV → DI is a function assigning a domain element to each
mechanism variable. Let SI be the set of all states over I. In general, whenever
the intended interpretation I is clear we shall tend to omit it. The following
standard logical notation will be used: I, s |= ϕ denotes that a first-order
formula ϕ whose variables are all in MV is true in I at state s. Similarly, we
let ϕI = {s ∈ SI |I, s |= ϕ}. Again, when the intended interpretation is clear,
we shall often simply write s |= ϕ.
Given interpretation I and an initial state s0, we shall interpret every mecha-
nism γ as a game form of almost-perfect information G(γ, s0, I). Let Cfg denote
the set of configurations, i.e., the set of all pairs 〈γ, s〉 where γ is a mechanism
or the empty mechanism Λ, and s is a state. We define a transition relation
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A
−→⊆ Cfg×Cfg for A ⊆ Ags such that c
A
−→ c′ states that the game can proceed
from c to c′ provided the agents A make some choice/move. In case the move
does not require any agent to make a choice, we will have A = ∅. In the stan-
dard way (see e.g. [10]), we define the
A
−→ relations inductively as the smallest
sets satisfying the following axioms and inference rules, the only novelty here
being the definition for chA:
〈x := t, s〉
∅
−→ 〈Λ, sxt 〉
〈chA(X), s〉
A
−→ 〈Λ, s′〉 where s′(y) = s(y) for all y 6∈ X
〈γ1, s〉
A
−→ 〈Λ, s′〉
〈γ1; γ2, s〉
A
−→ 〈γ2, s′〉
〈γ1, s〉
A
−→ 〈γ′1, s
′〉
〈γ1; γ2, s〉
A
−→ 〈γ′1; γ2, s
′〉
I, s |= B
〈ifB then γ1 else γ2, s〉
∅
−→ 〈γ1, s〉
I, s 6|= B
〈ifB then γ1 else γ2, s〉
∅
−→ 〈γ2, s〉
I, s 6|= B
〈whileB do γ, s〉
∅
−→ 〈Λ, s〉
I, s |= B
〈whileB do γ, s〉
∅
−→ 〈γ; whileB do γ, s〉
where sxt (y) = s(y) for y 6= x and s
x
t (x) = t
I,s, the interpretation of t in I at s.
Let Cfg∗ be the set of all finite nonempty sequences of configurations c0, c1,
. . . , cn such that ci = 〈γi, si〉 and
〈γ0, s0〉
A1−−→ 〈γ1, s1〉
A2−−→ . . .
An−−→ 〈γn, sn〉,
and let Cfg∗a be those sequences which end in a configuration cn for which
there is some configuration cn+1 and set A ⊆ Ags such that cn
A
−→ cn+1 and
a ∈ A. Infinite configuration sequences as well as finite configuration sequences
c0, . . . , cn for which there is no cn+1 and A such that cn
A
−→ cn+1 are called
terminal, and we denote the set of terminal sequences as Cfgt.
The move relations give rise to the game tree or semi-game G(γ, s0, I) which
starts at the initial position/configuration 〈γ, s0〉. We interpret Cfg∗ as the
set of (partial) histories of the game, where each agent a gets to move at the
positions which are in Cfg∗a. Note that we talk of a tree, since we can think of
possible loops as infinite branches. While we shall usually refer to G(γ, s0, I)
as a game (omitting the “semi”), note that a semi-game lacks a link between
runs/histories and preferences, for although I does contain information about
the players’ preferences over outcomes, the triple G does not have any mapping
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between histories of the game and outcomes. Such a mapping ô will be added
shortly.
A strategy for agent a in semi-gameG(γ0, s0, I) is a function σa : Cfg∗a → DI .
Given a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), i.e., a strategy σa for every agent
a ∈ Ags, we obtain a unique (possibly infinite) run which we denote as run(σ),
i.e., a maximal sequence of configurations
〈γ0, s0〉
A1−−→ 〈γ1, s1〉
A2−−→ . . .
where 〈γ0, s0〉 is the initial configuration, and for allAk+1 6= ∅ we have sk+1(xi) =
σi(〈γ0, s0〉, . . . , 〈γk, sk〉) for all i ∈ A, and sk+1(y) = sk(y) otherwise. If run(σ)
is finite, we let sσ denote the state associated to the last configuration of run(σ).
Preferences, Predicates, and Strategic Equilibria
Each agent has certain preferences over the various possible outcomes of the
mechanism. Given interpretation I and two outcomes o, o′∈DI , agent i prefers
o at least as much as o′ whenever o ≥Ii o
′ holds. Often, the elements in DI
will be elements of some product space, so that, e.g., (o1, o2) ∈ R×R will yield
outcome o1 for player 1 and outcome o2 for player 2, where (o1, o2) ≥i (o′1, o
′
2)
iff oi ≥ o′i.
An outcome function ô : Cfgt → DI assigns an outcome to every terminal
history, and we let Ô denote the the set of all outcome functions. Given a semi-
game G(γ, s, I) we then obtain a game G(γ, s, I, ô), where for each terminal
sequence of configurations c¯ the associated outcome is ô(c¯), and agent i prefers
c¯1 to c¯2 iff ô(c¯1) ≥i ô(c¯2). Given profile σ, we usually write ô(σ) instead of
ô(run(σ)), as we shall not be very careful about distinguishing σ from run(σ).
Subgames of games will play a special role in the equilibrium notion to be de-
fined subsequently. A game G′(γ′, s′, I, ô|G′) is a subgame of a game G(γ, s, I, ô)
iff there is a finite sequence of configurations 〈γ0, s0〉
A1−−→ 〈γ1, s1〉
A2−−→ . . .
An−−→
〈γn, sn〉 for some n ≥ 0 such that 〈γ0, s0〉 = 〈γ, s〉 and 〈γn, sn〉 = 〈γ′, s′〉.
The outcome function ô|G′ is the restriction of ô to G′, i.e., ô|G′(〈γn, sn〉, . . . ,
〈γn+k, sn+k〉) = ô(〈γ0, s0, 〉, . . . , 〈γn, sn〉, . . . , 〈γn+k, sn+k〉). Similarly for a strat-
egy profile σ for G, we let σ|G′ denote its restriction to G′, where σa|G′(〈γn, sn〉,
. . . , 〈γn+k, sn+k〉) = σ
a(〈γ0, s0, 〉, . . . , 〈γn, sn〉, . . . , 〈γn+k, sn+k〉).
Now that we have defined how executions of mechanisms give rise to game
trees, we can apply two well-known equilibrium notions from game theory
(see, e.g., [11] for a discussion of these notions). Given a strategy profile
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) and a strategy τ i for player i, let (τ i, σ−i) denote the modified
strategy profile (σ1, . . . , σi−1, τ i, σi+1, . . . , σn). Furthermore, let σ∼iτ denote
that the strategy profiles σ and τ differ at most regarding the strategy pre-
scribed for player i. Considering any game G(γ, s, I, ô), we call a strategy profile
σ a Nash equilibrium (NE) in G iff for all agents i and strategies τ i we have
ô(σ) ≥Ii ô((τ
i, σ−i)). Furthermore, σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) iff
for every subgame G′ of G, σ|G′ is a Nash equilibrium in G′.
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We shall usually obtain an outcome function ô from an extended predicate,
to be explained now. Given a state s :MV → DI and an outcome o ∈ DI , we
call (s, o) an extended state, or e-state for short. A predicate on I is simply a set
of states P ⊆ SI , and hence every FOL formula ϕ containing only variables of
MV gives rise to a predicate ϕI . Similarly, an extended predicate, or e-predicate
for short, is a set of e-states P ⊆ SI × DI , and every FOL formula which
contains variables of MV plus a new outcome variable xo 6∈ MV gives rise to
an e-predicate. We say that e-predicate P is functional iff for every s∈SI there
exists a unique o∈DI such that (s, o)∈P . Given two predicates (or alternatively,
two e-predicates), intersection, complementation, etc. can be defined simply set-
theoretically. Given a predicate P1 and an e-predicate P2, however, we define
P1 ∩ P2 = {(s, o) ∈ P2|s ∈ P1}.
Games can be obtained from extended predicates as follows: Given semi-
game G(γ, s, I) and e-predicate Q, let ÔQ contain all the outcome functions ô
which assign an outcome satisfying Q to every finite history, i.e.,
ÔQ = {ô ∈ Ô | ∀run(σ) ∈ Cfg
t : if run(σ) is finite then (sσ, ô(σ)) ∈ Q}.
Note that in general, ÔQ may be empty or contain multiple outcome assign-
ments. But given e-predicate Q and some ôQ ∈ ÔQ, we are able to turn the
semi-game G(γ, s, I) into a game G(γ, s, I, ôQ).
4 Mechanism Correctness
4.1 Hoare Logic: From Programs to Games
Hoare in [7] introduced correctness assertions of the form {P}γ{Q}, where γ
is a program and P and Q are predicates. The intended interpretation of this
assertion is that in every state which satisfies P , any terminating execution of
program γ ends in a state which satisfies Q. In this paper, we shall extend this
approach to reason about the correctness of game-theoretic mechanisms under
subgame-perfect equilibria.
In lifting standard Hoare triples to games we generalise them in two ways.
We can view the postcondition Q as specifying the winning condition for the
game, i.e., all plays of the game ending in a state which satisfies Q are a win,
all others a loss. Note that under the partial correctness reading, infinite runs
are in fact also treated as wins. Our first generalisation consists of moving
from simple win/loss situations, represented by predicates, to general preference
structures. This is achieved by moving from predicates to e-predicates which
also specify the outcome or payoff at a state. Second and more importantly, we
move from simple claims about the existence of a strategy profile satisfying the
postcondition to more refined claims about the existence of a strategy profile
which has an equilibrium property. This equilibrium property is generally quite
complex, and it is the complexity of this equilibrium property which can present
a challenge to compositionality, in particular to the Hoare inference rule for
composing two programs/games (see lemma 1 below).
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Before defining our mechanism correctness assertions {P}γ{Q}, it is impor-
tant to point out that we are following an extensional rather than an intensional
approach (see also [10]). We assume that pre- and postconditions are predicates,
i.e., semantic objects rather than formulas of some logical language. Naturally,
this means that the calculus we present later is not fully syntactic. In the in-
tensional approach, however, one runs into the problem of expressiveness, since
it may happen that under a given interpretation the logical language is not
rich enough to express all the preconditions needed. This complicates com-
pleteness proofs considerably, due to the need for an arithmetisation of syntax
(Go¨delisation), etc. Furthermore, we feel that this extra work yields more in-
sights about the logic used for the assertion language (usually first-order logic)
than about the game theoretic mechanisms and their equilibria, which is what
we are interested in here.
Due to its fully syntactic nature, it does seem likely that the automated ver-
ification of mechanisms would benefit from using the intensional approach, and
we do intend to investigate this approach in the future (see also comments in the
last section). However, note that in contrast to most computer programs whose
domain of computation contains at least the natural numbers, mechanisms like
voting procedures often use a finite domain of computation, e.g., because there is
only a small number of possible candidates running for president. In such cases,
it may in fact be easier to do automatic verification using the extensions of the
predicates directly. Second, even if this is not the case, the best logic to choose
for automated verification may very much depend on the class of mechanisms
under consideration, the theorem prover to be used, etc. Hence, for our present
purposes, we decide to postpone these issues since they are more relevant for
implementation, and the extensional approach conveniently allows us to do so.
4.2 Mechanism Correctness and Implementation
Assume that we are given some interpretation I, a mechanism γ, and e-predicates
P and Q. Then we say that {P}γ{Q} is valid in I, denoted as I |= {P}γ{Q},
iff
for every (s, o) ∈ P , there is an outcome function ô ∈ ÔQ and a
strategy profile σ such that σ is an SPE in G(γ, s, I, ô) and ô(σ) = o.
The notion defined indeed generalises the standard partial correctness as-
sertions of Hoare in the following way: Given an arbitrary element d ∈ DI
and a predicate P ⊆ SI , let P ∗ = {(s, d)|s ∈ P}. Then given any program
γ ∈ MPL(PRG) and predicates P and Q, the partial correctness assertion
{P}γ{Q} holds in interpretation I iff I |= {P ∗}γ{Q∗}.
In order to link our mechanism correctness assertion to the game-theoretic
literature on mechanism design and implementation theory [11, 9, 15], we shall
define our version of the mechanism design problem more formally. Given a set
of possible outcomes DI of the mechanism and the set of preference profiles over
DI , a social choice correspondence f maps a preference profile (≥i)i∈Ags to a set
of outcomes X ⊆ DI . The idea is that at preference profile (≥i)i∈Ags, society
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or the mechanism designer wants one of the outcomes in f((≥i)i∈Ags) to be
implemented or achieved. In case f((≥i)i∈Ags) is empty, society is indifferent to
the outcome actually realised. The mechanism design problem is to find a mech-
anism which implements the social choice correspondence in a non-centralised
manner, i.e., no matter what the preferences of the agents are, self-interested
agents will have an incentive to play so that the outcome intended by the de-
signer will obtain. We shall now see how this problem can be translated into
our mechanism correctness assertions.
For a preference profile (≥i)i∈Ags where each ≥i⊆ DI×DI , let I[(≥i)i∈Ags]
denote the model which is obtained from I by replacing the interpretation of the
preference relations by the ≥i. Furthermore, for a given social choice correspon-
dence f , let f∗(x) = {(s, o) ∈ SI ×DI |o ∈ f(x)}, and let Q be any functional
e-predicate. Then we say that the pair (γ,Q) SPE-implements a social choice
correspondence f iff for all preference profiles (≥i)i∈Ags we have
I[(≥i)i∈Ags] |= {f
∗((≥i)i∈Ags)}γ{Q}.
To see what this statement actually expresses, let us unpack the definition:
(γ,Q) SPE-implements social choice correspondence f iff
for all preference profiles (≥i)i∈Ags, for all states s ∈ SI , and for all
o ∈ f((≥i)i∈Ags), there is some ô ∈ ÔQ and some strategy profile σ
such that σ is an SPE for G(γ, s, I[(≥i)i∈Ags], ô) and ô(σ) = o.
Note that this notion of implementation is a weak notion which does not ask
every but only some equilibrium profile to yield the desired outcome, hence
strictly speaking we are dealing with mechanism design rather than implemen-
tation theory. In the remainder of this section, we shall look at a few concrete
examples of mechanism design.
4.3 Auctions
Over the domain of natural numbers, the mechanism
ch{1,2}({x1, x2})
can represent a sealed-bid auction where the two players simultaneously choose
their bids, e.g., in euros, in order to obtain some desirable object, say a piano.
Since this game is atomic, the notions of SPE and NE coincide, and hence we
can phrase the existence of Nash equilibria using the correctness notion defined
earlier.
Consider the case of a second-price auction where the player who makes the
highest bid has to pay the price of the loser’s bid. We assume that our model
I has the natural numbers as its domain, and contains two constants v1 and v2
whose values denote the private valuations of the players. Instead of representing
outcomes as pairs o = (o1, o2) we shall assume that there are two outcome
variables o1 and o2 which determine the payoffs of player 1 and 2, respectively.
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A player’s payoff is 0 if he fails to obtain the piano, and his valuation minus
the other player’s bid if he does obtain the piano. The preference ordering over
elements of the domain is the obvious one: d1 ≥i d2 iff d1 ≥ d2. Note that a
player’s preference relation is completely determined by his valuation.
The postcondition of the second-price auction is the e-predicate expressed
by the following formula ψ:
(x1 ≥ x2 → (o1 = v1 − x2 ∧ o2 = 0)) ∧ (x1 < x2 → (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − x1))
It is easy to see that this postcondition expresses the payoffs of the players in
the second-price auction. Note also that the postcondition fomalises the tie-
breaking rule which assigns the object to player 1 in case the bids are equal.
Now consider the e-predicate expressed by the following formula ϕ:
(v1 ≥ v2 → (o1 = v1 − v2 ∧ o2 = 0)) ∧ (v1 < v2 → (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − v1))
We claim that I |= {ϕI}ch{1,2}({x1, x2}){ψ
I}: If player 1’s valuation is at
least as high as player 2’s valuation, then the auction has a Nash-equilibrium in
which player 2’s payoff is 0 and player 1’s payoff is the difference between the
valuations. Similarly in case player 2’s valuation is higher.
To see why this is so, note that it is a well-known result in game theory
(see, e.g., [11]) that in a second-price sealed-bid auction, bidding your valuation
results in a Nash equilibrium (in fact, it is even a dominant strategy). Hence,
if each player bids xi = vi, the outcomes are the ones specified by ϕ, and the
strategies are in equilibrium.
In fact, from the validity of {ϕI}ch{1,2}({x1, x2}){ψ
I} we can derive some
information about the nature of the winning strategies. For suppose w.l.o.g.
that v1 ≥ v2. Using precondition ϕ, we know that o1 = v1 − v2 and o2 = 0.
Now we can distinguish two cases: In the first case, we have a Nash equilibrium
(and hence also a SPE) where player 1 bids less than player 2, i.e., x1 < x2.
Now using the postcondition ψ and the fact that the outcome variables o1 and
o2 are never changed by any mechanism, we know that o1 = 0 and o2 = v2−x1.
Hence x1 = v2 = v1 and x2 > v2 = v1, i.e., the players’ valuations must be the
same and player 2 must bid higher than his valuation. It is easy to check that
these bids indeed constitute a Nash equilibrium. In the second case, we have
a Nash equilibrium with x1 ≥ x2. Again using the postcondition, o2 = 0 and
o1 = v1 − x2. Hence, x2 = v2 and x1 ≥ v2. Thus, player 2 bids his valuation
and player 1 bids at least player 2’s valuation. Again, these bid combinations
all constitute Nash equilibria, and our intended equilibrium, where each player
bids his own valuation, is included in this second case.
In a private-value environment, a sealed-bid second-price auction is essen-
tially outcome equivalent with an English auction, where bidders keep increasing
the price over a number of bidding rounds until there is no more bidder who
wants to obtain the object for a higher price. In an English auction, bidding
slightly more than the second-highest valuation will suffice to obtain the object.
Analogously, we can consider a sealed-bid first-price auction where the win-
ner has to pay his own bid rather than the second-highest bid. The first-price
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auction is essentially outcome equivalent to the Dutch (or descending) auction,
where the auctioneer continues to lower the price of the object until a player
decides to take the object for the current price. If the players’ valuations are
not public, the safe strategy is to stop the auction just below one’s valuation,
the result being that the player with the highest valuation will obtain the object
for the price of almost his valuation.
Contrary to these results, we shall show in section 6 that from the perspective
of SPEs, the Dutch auction is also similar to a sealed-bid second-price auction.
In order to apply SPEs as a solution concept, we need to assume that players’
preferences are public. In an auction, this means that players know each other’s
valuations. In this case, however, if v1 > v2, player 1 can wait longer before
calling out to stop the Dutch auction, he can wait until the prices reach v2 or just
above. Hence, when preferences are public, it would seem that Dutch auction
and second-price auction share a SPE. We will verify this claim in section 6,
thereby also obtaining the precise conditions for this equivalence.
Finally, a further remark relating auction preconditions to the notion of
SPE-implementation. In a second-price auction, we want to SPE-implement
the social choice correspondence f which assigns to a preference profile (v1, v2)
the outcome (o1, o2) with o1 = v1 − v2 and o2 = 0 in case v1 ≥ v2 and o2 =
v2 − v1 and o1 = 0 in case v1 < v2. While the precondition ϕ given above
does capture this social choice correspondence in an intuitive sense, note that
it is not the precondition used in our definition of SPE-implementation. This
is because SPE-implementation, as we defined it, requires a correctness claim
for each preference profile separately. In contrast, our precondition ϕ covers all
preference profiles in one precondition, since it conditions the assigned outcomes
on the relationship between the valuation constants. This formulation leads to
a much more general result and hence is usually preferable. In the next section,
we shall present an example using the notion of SPE-implementation literally.
4.4 Solomon’s Dilemma
The biblical dilemma of Solomon (1 Kings 3:16-28) has often been used to illus-
trate the basic idea of implementation theory [11, 9]. In the same spirit, we shall
use it here to illustrate our notion of SPE-implementation. The game-theorist
will get the additional benefit of seeing a well-known example of implementation
theory translated into our framework. Solomon’s dilemma is that two women
have come before him with a small child, both claiming to be the mother of the
child.
He sent for a sword, and when it was brought, he said, “Cut the
living child in two and give each woman half of it.” The real mother,
her heart full of love for her son, said to the king, “Please, Your
Majesty, don’t kill the child! Give it to her!” But the other woman
said, “Don’t give it to either of us; go on and cut it in two.” Then
Solomon said, “Don’t kill the child! Give it to the first woman, she
is its real mother.”
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The story exemplifies the need for a mechanism very well: Since Solomon
does not know who the real mother is (i.e., he does not know the women’s pref-
erences), he cannot impose the outcome of his choice function directly. Rather,
he needs to devise a mechanism which will provide an incentive to the women
to reveal this information to him.
To mathematically model Solomon’s situation, we consider three outcomes:
a (baby is given to Anne, player 1), b (baby is given to Bess, player 2), and c
(baby is cut in two). Solomon has to consider two possible situations: In case
Anne is the real mother, the preference profile is given by θ1, in case Bess is the
real mother, the preference profile is θ2.
θ1 : a >1 b >1 c and b >2 c >2 a
θ2 : a >1 c >1 b and b >2 a >2 c
Solomon’s problem is to find a mechanism which implements the social choice
correspondence f for which f(θ1) = {a} and f(θ2) = {b}. In spite of Solomon’s
apparent cleverness, it turns out that f is not Nash-implementable (see [9]
for a proof). However, by slightly modifying the problem, one can obtain an
implementation nonetheless.
Let us consider the situation where instead of quarreling about a child, Anne
and Bess argue about who is the owner of a painting. Furthermore, we allow
Solomon to impose fines on the two women, i.e., we allow for monetary side
payments. We can then think of the possible outcomes as triples (x,m1,m2),
where x ∈ {0, 1, 2} denotes who obtains the painting (0 denoting that it is cut in
two), and mi denotes the fine player i has to pay to Solomon. Now suppose that
the legitimate owner of the paining has valuation vH and the other woman has
valuation vL, where vH > vL > 0. Then if player i does not get the painting,
her payoff is −mi. If she does get the painting, her payoff will be vH−mi in case
she is the legitimate owner, and vL −mi otherwise. If player i is the legitimate
owner, these payoffs will then induce a preference profile θi in the obvious way.
In this new setup, Solomon wishes to implement the social choice rule f for
which f(θi) = {(i, 0, 0)}, i.e., the painting is given to the legitimate owner and
nobody has to pay any fines (we assume here that Solomon does not engage in
dispute resolution to make money). More precisely, Solomon is looking for a
pair (γ,Q) which SPE-implements f , i.e., for which
I[θ1] |= {o = (1, 0, 0)}γ{Q} and I[θ2] |= {o = (2, 0, 0)}γ{Q}.
The following mechanism γ achieves this goal: First, Anne is asked whether
the painting is hers or not. If she says no, the painting is given to Bess and no
fines are imposed. Otherwise, Bess is asked the same question. If Bess answers
the painting is not hers, it is given to Anne, again without imposing any fines.
Finally, in case both players have claimed to be the owner of the painting, Anne
is fined a small amount ε > 0 and Bess gets the painting but has to pay a large
amount M for which vL < M < vH . The mechanism γ can be programmed as
follows, where we take the real numbers as our domain:
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ch{1}({x1});
if x1 > 0 then owner := 2
else ch{2}({x2});
if x2 > 0 then owner := 1 else owner := 0
As for the payoff specification, let Q be the e-predicate corresponding to the
following formula:
(owner = 1→ o = (1, 0, 0))
∧ (owner = 2→ o = (2, 0, 0))
∧ (owner = 0→ o = (2, ε,M))
Game theoretically, it is easy to verify that for preference profile θi, the following
game form has a subgame-perfect equilibrium yielding outcome (i, 0, 0). We
will return to this example in section 6 and give a formal verification of this
mechanism.
21
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5 Axiomatic Mechanism Verification
5.1 A Hoare-style Calculus
Below we present a calculus for deriving the correctness assertions we introduced
above. Note that the calculus is a natural generalisation of the standard Hoare
calculus, where the only addition is an axiom for the new construct chA. Given
e-predicate P , we let P [x/t] = {(s, o) ∈ SI ×DI |(sxt , o) ∈ P}.
{Q[x/t]}x := t{Q} (ass.)
{wpre(chA(X), Q, I)}chA(X){Q} (choice)
{P}γ1{R} {R}γ2{Q}
{P}γ1; γ2{Q}
(comp.)
{P ∩BI}γ1{Q} {P ∩BI}γ2{Q}
{P}ifB then γ1 else γ2{Q}
(if)
{P ∩BI}γ{P}
{P}whileB do γ{P ∩BI}
(while)
P ⊆ P ′, {P ′}γ{Q′}, Q′ ⊆ Q
{P}γ{Q}
(l.c.)
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In the choice axiom, wpre(γ,Q, I) refers to the weakest precondition of Q under
γ. Given interpretation I, mechanism γ, and e-predicate Q, we define wpre as
follows:
wpre(γ,Q, I) = {(s, o) ∈ SI ×DI | ∃ô ∈ ÔQ∃σ : σ is an SPE in
G(γ, s, I, ô) and ô(σ) = o}
Note that by definition, I |= {wpre(γ,Q, I)}γ{Q}, and for every e-predicate P
such that I |= {P}γ{Q}, we have P ⊆ wpre(γ,Q, I). Weakest preconditions
will play an important role in the completeness proof of section 5.3.
Let ∆I be the smallest set of correctness assertions {P}γ{Q} over I which
includes the axioms and is closed under the inference rules above. We shall
usually write {P}γ{Q} ∈ ∆I as I ⊢ {P}γ{Q}. In order to gain some intu-
itions regarding this calculus, the reader may wish to consult section 6 before
proceeding with the subsequent soundness and completeness results.
Before establishing soundness and completeness of the calculus presented,
some further comments regarding the choice axiom are in order. As mentioned,
the calculus is extensional in the sense that preconditions and postconditions are
semantic rather than syntactic objects, predicates rather than formulas of, say,
first-order logic. As a consequence, we do not get a syntactic proof system, but
rather what one might call a compositional proof methodology. Hence, while
the precondition of the choice axiom may seem tautological, it still suffices to
reduce reasoning about subgame-perfect equilibria in complex games to reason-
ing about Nash equilibria in simple games. Hence, while we are still in need of
a semantic argument to establish the Nash equilibrium, it is a simpler semantic
argument which applies only to the simplest game, the atomic choice game. As
the examples in section 6 will illustrate, this decomposition is achieved by mov-
ing the complexity from the mechanism into the mechanism’s postcondition or
payoff assignment, and it is this which the calculus allows one to do. In other
words, the complexity is moved from the dynamic to the static part, from the
mechanism to the predicates describing pre- and postconditions.
In verification practice, it turns out that the precondition of the choice ax-
iom is often rather analogous to the precondition of the assignment axiom,
where Nash equilibrium strategies are substituted for the choice variables in
the precondition. Slightly more formally, suppose that the postcondition Q is a
functional e-predicate which simply assigns outcomes based on the choice vari-
ables, and that Q only contains these choice variables and no other variables.
An example of such a postcondition is the postcondition ψ of the second-price
auction discussed in section 4.3. Since this postcondition depends on the state
only in terms of the choice variables, we can say that the weakest precondition
of the choice construct is simply Q where each choice variable xi is replaced
by the Nash equilibrium strategy of player i in the choice game played in any
state with payoffs given by Q. In fact, this is precisely what happened with
the precondition ϕ of the second-price auction where xi is replaced by vi. In
general, however, things are not quite so simple, as the analysis of the Dutch
auction in section 6 will illustrate.
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5.2 Soundness
The following lemma presents the first of the two most difficult cases of the
subsequent soundness result. It guarantees that equilibria of subgames can be
composed into equilibria of the supergame.
Lemma 1 (Composition) If we have both I |= {P}γ1{R} and I |= {R}γ2{Q}
then I |= {P}γ1; γ2{Q}.
Proof. Let (s, o) ∈ P , and consider G(γ1; γ2, s, I). By our first assumption,
there is an outcome function ô1 ∈ ÔR and a strategy profile σ1 such that σ1 is
an SPE in G1(γ1, s, I, ô1) and ô1(σ1) = o.
Now for every finite run τ1 of G1 ending in some terminal state t with
ô1(τ1) = ot, since (t, ot) ∈ R, we know by our second assumption that there is
some outcome function ôt ∈ ÔQ and some strategy profile σt such that σt is an
SPE in Gt(γ2, t, I, ôt) and ôt(σt) = ot. Taken together, σ1 and the σt induce a
strategy profile σ for G, and similarly ô1 (for the infinite runs of G1) and the ôt
induce an outcome function ô ∈ ÔQ for G. Hence, it remains to show that σ is
an SPE and that ô(σ) = o.
First, it is easily seen that ô(σ) = o, for ô1(σ1) = o, and so in case σ1 is
finite, (sσ1 , o) ∈ R, from which by definition it follows that ô(σ) = o. Second,
we need to show that σ is an SPE in G(γ1; γ2, s, I, ô). So consider any subgame
G′(pi, t, I) of G. In the easy case, G′ will be a subgame of some Gt′ , where t′
is a terminal state in G1, for in this case, our second assumption immediately
guarantees the equilibrium property. In the more complicated case, G′ lies
partly in G1. For simplicity, we shall for the rest of this argument assume that
σ = σ1·σ2 refers to its restriction to G′. So consider any strategy profile τ1·τ2
for G′ such that σ = σ1·σ2 ∼i τ1·τ2 = τ , where σ1 and τ1 both yield finite runs.
Suppose further that ô(σ) = o0 and ô(τ) = o2, as depicted below.
t
γ1
γ2
σ1 τ1
o0 o1≥i
σ2 σ2 τ2
o0 o1 ≥i o2
Now supposing that ô(τ1·σ2) = o1, we know by definition of σ that o1 ≥i o2,
and that ô1(τ1) = o1. Furthermore, since σ1 was an SPE in G1, we know also
that ô1(σ1) ≥i o1. Since o0 = ô(σ) = ô1(σ1), we can conclude by transitivity
that o0 ≥i o2.
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Finally, note that the case where either σ1 or τ1 or both are infinite can be
treated by a simplification of the above argument. ✷
The following lemma isolates the arguments needed to prove the soundness
of the inference rule for iteration. Our assumption that our model I contains a
uniformly worst element is needed here.
Lemma 2 If I |= {P ∩BI}γ{P} then I |= {P}whileB do γ{P ∩BI}.
Proof. Roughly speaking, the proof is an iterated application of the preceding
composition lemma, but a few subtleties have to be dealt with, in particular the
possibility of newly arising infinite runs.
Suppose that (s, o) ∈ P . In order to define a strategy σ and outcome function
ô for G(while B do γ, s, I), we shall inductively define strategy profile σn and
outcome function ôn for game Gn which consists of the first n iterations of game
G. Game G0 simply consists of configuration (Λ, s), strategy profile σ0 consists
of doing nothing, and as an outcome function we take ô0((Λ, s)) = o. Note that
ô0 ∈ ÔP .
For the inductive step, define Gn+1 as Gn where for every terminal state
(t, ot) ∈ P ∩ BI in Gn we concatenate Gt(γ, t, I) to t. By our assumption, for
each such terminal state, we have an outcome function ôt and a SPE strategy
profile σt, and we define σn+1 and ôn+1 in the natural way, by extending σn
and ôn to Gn+1 using the ôt and σt.
Now with slight abuse of notation, we can define strategy profile σ and
outcome function ô for G as follows: We take σ =
⋃
i σi, i.e., we simply take
the profile generated by the σi. Similarly, we define ô =
⋃
i ôi, i.e., every run τ
of G which is part of some Gi is evaluated according to ôi. Furthermore, there
may be new infinite runs in G which are not part of any Gi, but are instead
generated by an infinite number of plays of γ itself. Given such an infinite run
τ , we define ô(τ) = oc in case there is some j such that for all k ≥ j we have
ôk(τ |Gk) = oc; otherwise, we let ô(τ) = −∞. Thus, for infinite runs which
converge on a certain outcome oc, we assign oc to the run, and otherwise simply
the uniformly worst outcome. Note that ô ∈ Ô
P∩BI
.
Observe first that ô(σ) = o. For we have ô1(σ1) = o, ô2(σ2) = ô1(σ1) = o,
etc., and so in case σ is finite, there is some maximal k such that ô(σ) = ôk(σk) =
o. In case σ is infinite, we have a constant and hence converging sequence of
outcomes consisting of o only.
Hence, all we need to show is that σ is an SPE in G(whileB do γ, s, I, ô).
So consider any subgame G′ of G and a strategy τ ∼i σ such that ô(σ) = o0 and
ô(τ) = o2. Now the reasoning can proceed along the lines of the composition
lemma and the figure given there: In case τ yields a run which lies in Gk, we can
show by induction on k that o0 ≥i o2, each step involving the reasoning carried
out in the composition lemma. On the other hand, in case τ is an infinite run
generated by infinitely many γ-repetitions, we need to distinguish two cases: In
the easy case where ô(τ) = −∞, the result is obvious. In the more complicated
case, ô(τ) = oc due to a sequence of outcomes which converges on oc. Suppose
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k is the smallest number for which ôk(τ |Gk) = oc. Then again we can apply the
reasoning of the composition lemma k times to show that o0 ≥i oc. ✷
Theorem 3 (Soundness) If I ⊢ {P}γ{Q} then I |= {P}γ{Q}.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation, so we start with
showing the validity of the axioms. The soundness of the chA axiom follows by
definition.
For I ⊢ {Q[x/t]}x := t{Q}, suppose that (s, o) ∈ Q[x/t]. We know that
all runs in G(x := t, s, I) are finite. Since no choices need to be made in
G(x := t, s, I), the one existing strategy profile σ is trivially an equilibrium
in G(x := t, s, I, ô) for any outcome function ô ∈ ÔQ, and in particular for
the outcome function ô which assigns o to σ. Note that since (s, o) ∈ Q[x/t],
(sxt , o) ∈ Q, and hence ô ∈ ÔQ.
Turning to the inference rules, note that the case of composition is treated
in lemma 1, and the logical consequence rule is an easy consequence of the se-
mantic definition of I |= {P}γ{Q}. For conditional branching, the conclusion
follows directly from the two premises, given that G(ifB then γ1 else γ2, s, I)
is either G1(γ1, s, I) or G2(γ2, s, I). Finally, lemma 2 takes care of iteration. ✷
Note that the soundness result also holds for Nash equilibria: If in the defi-
nition of I |= {P}γ{Q} we replace SPE by NE, the above soundness result can
still be proved. This is as it should be, since every subgame-perfect equilibrium
is also a Nash equilibrium.
5.3 Completeness
Like in the completeness proof for the standard Hoare calculus, the notion of
a weakest precondition plays an important role for our calculus as well. The
following lemma contains the essential argument for the completeness result.
Lemma 4 (Decomposition) If I |= {P}γ1; γ2{Q}, then for some R we have
I |= {P}γ1{R} and I |= {R}γ2{Q}.
Proof. Our assumption is I |= {P}γ1; γ2{Q}. Let R = wpre(γ2, Q, I), then all
we need to show is that I |= {P}γ1{R}. So supposing that (s, o) ∈ P , we need
to provide an outcome function ô1 ∈ ÔR and a strategy profile σ1 such that σ1
is an SPE in G1(γ1, s, I, ô1) and ô1(σ1) = o.
Consider the outcome function ô ∈ ÔQ and the strategy profile σ forG(γ1; γ2,
s, I) provided by our assumption. We let σ1 = σ|G1. As for the definition of
ô1, for every infinite run τ of G1 we let ô1(τ) = ô(τ). If on the other hand τ
is finite, we define ô1(τ) = ô(τ ·στ ), where στ = σ|Gτ . By our assumption, we
have ô1(σ1) = ô(σ) = o. Furthermore, since (sτ , ô(τ ·στ )) ∈ R, ô1 ∈ ÔR.
Hence, all we need to show is that σ1 is an SPE in G1(γ1, s, I, ô1). So
consider any subgame G′1 = (pi, t, I, ô1) of G1, and a strategy profile τ1 ∼i σ1,
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where we take ô1(σ1) = o0 and ô1(τ1) = o1. Assume first that both σ1 and
τ1 are finite. Considering G
′ = (pi; γ2, t, I, ô), we know that there is a profile
σ2 (derived from σ) such that σ1·σ2 is an SPE in G′ and σ1·σ2 ∼i τ1·σ2. The
situation is depicted below.
t
γ1
γ2
σ1 τ1
o0 o1≥i
σ2 σ2
o0 o1
By definition, we know that ô1(σ1) = ô(σ1·σ2) = o0 and ô1(τ1) = ô(τ1·σ2) =
o1, and hence we must have o0 ≥i o1.
Note that in case either σ1 or τ1 or both are infinite, a simplified version of
the above argument can be applied. ✷
The above lemma is what distinguishes subgame-perfect equilibria from Nash
equilibria, since only the former can be decomposed in the way shown by the
decomposition lemma. For Nash equilibria, the above lemma fails: when defin-
ing ô1 in the above proof, we cannot be sure that ô1 ∈ ÔR, since a subprofile
of an equilibrium profile may itself not be an equilibrium profile. Consequently,
also the following completeness result does not hold for Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5 (Completeness) If I |= {P}γ{Q} then I ⊢ {P}γ{Q}.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of γ. For x := t, note
that for any state s, the game G(x := t, s, I) contains only a single finite run
ending in state sxt . Observe that P ⊆ Q[x/t]: if (s, o) ∈ P , every run terminates
in state (sxt , o) ∈ Q, and hence (s, o) ∈ Q[x/t]. Applying the logical consequence
rule to the assignment axiom, we then obtain I ⊢ {P}x := t{Q}.
For chA, we use the axiom and the logical consequence rule, and for γ1; γ2,
we can appeal to the decomposition lemma, induction hypothesis, and the com-
position rule. The case of if B then γ1 else γ2 is straight-forward, so we only
need to deal with the while-loop.
For iteration, suppose that I |= {P}while B do γ{Q}. Similarly, to the
proof of the decomposition lemma, we let R = wpre(whileB do γ,Q, I). First,
we shall establish that I |= {R ∩ BI}γ{R}. By definition, we have I |=
{R}while B do γ{Q}. From this, I |= {R ∩ BI}γ; while B do γ{Q} is eas-
ily seen to follow. Now we can apply the decomposition lemma: Since the R
provided by the proof of the decomposition lemma is precisely the one we defined
above, we can conclude that I |= {R ∩BI}γ{R}.
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Now using the induction hypothesis and applying the while-rule, we obtain
I ⊢ {R}whileB do γ{R ∩BI}.
Since P ⊆ R and R ∩ BI ⊆ Q, we can apply the logical consequence rule to
derive I ⊢ {P}whileB do γ{Q}. ✷
6 Applying the Calculus - Some Examples
6.1 Solomon’s Dilemma
Consider again Solomon’s 2-stage mechanism given in section 4.4, where we will
replace the variable owner by w to save space. We will show one of the two
required correctness claims, namely that I[θ1] ⊢
{o = (1, 0, 0)}
ch{1}({x1});
if x1 > 0 thenw := 2
else ch{2}({x2});
if x2 > 0 thenw := 1 elsew := 0
{(w = 1→ o = (1, 0, 0)) ∧ (w = 2→ o = (2, 0, 0)) ∧ (w = 0→ o = (2, ε,M))},
corresponding to the situation where player 1 is the real owner of the paint-
ing. Note that for ease of notation we are now simply representing (extended)
predicates by formulas in first-order logic.
Denoting the postcondition by Q0, we have I[θ1] ⊢ {o = (2, ε,M)}w :=
0{Q0} and I[θ1] ⊢ {o = (1, 0, 0)}w := 1{Q0} using the assignment axiom.
Hence, by the if-rule we have I[θ1] ⊢
{(x2 > 0→ o = (1, 0, 0)) ∧ (x2 ≤ 0→ o = (2, ε,M))}
if x2 > 0 thenw := 1 elsew := 0
{Q0}.
Denote the new precondition by Q1. Since in θ1, we have (1, 0, 0) >2 (2, ε,M),
we know that when choosing a value for x2, player 2 will choose the outcome
(1, 0, 0), and hence we have I[θ1] ⊢ {o = (1, 0, 0)}ch{2}({x2}){Q1}. On the other
hand, we know by the assignment rule that I[θ1] ⊢ {o = (2, 0, 0)}w := 2{Q0}.
Hence, using the if-rule and composition, we have I[θ1] ⊢
{(x1 > 0→ o = (2, 0, 0)) ∧ (x1 ≤ 0→ o = (1, 0, 0))}
if x1 > 0 thenw := 2
else ch{2}({x2});
if x2 > 0 thenw := 1 elsew := 0
{Q0},
where we denote the new precondition by Q2. Finally, since (1, 0, 0) >1 (2, 0, 0),
player 1 will choose (1, 0, 0) in an equilibrium, and so we have I[θ1] ⊢ {o =
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(1, 0, 0)}ch{1}({x1}){Q2}. Using the composition rule, we have thereby suc-
ceeded in verifying the original claim, that the 2-stage mechanism does indeed
provide an SPE-implementation solving Solomon’s (modified) dilemma.
6.2 Auctions
Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
We have already presented the sealed-bid second-price auction in section 4.3. We
argued that in the relevant model I where two players have private valuations
represented by the constants v1 and v2, we have I |=
{(v1 ≥ v2 → (o1 = v1 − v2 ∧ o2 = 0)) ∧ (v1 < v2 → (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − v1))}
ch{1,2}({x1, x2})
{(x1 ≥ x2 → (o1 = v1 − x2 ∧ o2 = 0)) ∧ (x1 < x2 → (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − x1))},
due to the fact that we obtain a Nash equilibrium if each player bids his
valuation, i.e. xi = vi. We abbreviate the given precondition with P and
the postcondition with R. Note that P is not the weakest precondition of
G(ch{1,2}({x1, x2}), R, I), and hence I ⊢ {P}ch{1,2}({x1, x2}){R} is not an ax-
iom. This is because there are equilibria other than the one mentioned. For
example, suppose that v1 ≥ v2. Then if v2 ≤ x1 = x2 ≤ v1, we also have a
Nash equilibrium. Hence, for v2 ≤ k ≤ v1, we can also consider the following
precondition Pk
(v1 ≥ v2 → (o1 = v1 − k ∧ o2 = 0)) ∧ (v1 < v2 → (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − k))
for which we also have I |= {Pk}ch{1,2}({x1, x2}){R}. Consequently, Pk ∨ P
is weaker than P for k 6= v2, and hence I ⊢ {P}ch{1,2}({x1, x2}){R} is indeed
not an axiom. Still, it can be easily obtained from the choice axiom using the
logical consequence rule.
Dutch Auction
We shall now illustrate the calculus in action for verifying the more complex
Dutch auction which involves a while loop. In fact, we shall illustrate that the
Dutch auction is equivalent to the preceding sealed-bid second-price auction
in the very weak sense that the Dutch auction has the same subgame-perfect
equilibrium as the sealed-bid second-price auction, where the player with the
higher valuation receives the object, paying the price of the other player’s valu-
ation. More formally, we shall show that both implement the same social choice
correspondence defined in section 4.3, under certain conditions.
As mentioned in section 4.3, in a Dutch auction, the auctioneer continues
to lower the price of an object until a player decides to take the object for
the current price. Over the domain of natural numbers, the Dutch auction is
captured by the following mechanism α:
p := init;
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w := 0;
while p > 0 ∧ w = 0 do
ch{1,2}({x1, x2});
if x1 > 0 thenw := 1
else if x2 > 0 thenw := 2
else p := p− 1
Variable w keeps track of the winner, p keeps track of the current price, and is
initialised to some value init. For each offer, both players can choose a nonnega-
tive number signaling their desire to buy the object for price p. As the algorithm
is written down here, in case both players want to buy the object, player 1 gets
it. Note that it is also subtleties like these which provide an argument for
formally specifying and verifying mechanisms. The following postcondition Q
naturally assigns payoffs at the end of the Dutch auction:
(w = 1→ (o1 = v1 − p ∧ o2 = 0))
∧ (w = 2→ (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − p))
∧ (w = 0→ (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = 0))
Our goal will be to show that I ⊢ {P}α{Q}, i.e., just like the sealed-bid auction
(ch{1,2}({x1, x2}), R) SPE-implements our desired social choice correspondence,
so does (α,Q).
As in standard program verification, the art of proving the correctness of a
while-loop lies in finding an invariant which remains true at the beginning of
every loop execution. Consider the following invariant Inv:
v1 ≥ v2 > 0 ∧ p ≥ v2 ∧ w ∈ {0, 1, 2}
∧ (w = 1→ (o1 = v1 − p ∧ o2 = 0))
∧ (w = 2→ (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − p))
∧ (w = 0→ (o1 = v1 − v2 ∧ o2 = 0))
Note that in order to simplify the exposition we have restricted ourselves to
the case where v1 ≥ v2, but this restriction is in no way essential. The invariant
is similar to the desired postcondition Q, the main difference lies in the situation
where there is no winner. In that case, our desired outcome will be the SPE of
the remaining subgame, the outcome designated by our social choice function,
o1 = v1−v2 and o2 = 0. Besides these winning conditions, we state the range of
variable w as well as two conditions for v2. First, v2 must never be greater than
the current price, for our equilibrium strategies force us to exit the loop at v2.
If, e.g., the auction started with a price below v2, player 1 could immediately
take the object and thereby receive a payoff higher than v1 − v2. Second, v2
must be strictly greater than 0, for otherwise, it would be optimal for player 1
to take the object in the last round, where the price p = 1, and hence obtaining
a payoff lower than v1 − v2. Note that the need for these additional constraints
was discovered in the verification process and hence the “discovery” of these
crucial side conditions should be regarded as a result of the verification effort.
We will now proceed to show that Inv is indeed an invariant, i.e., that I ⊢
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{Inv ∧ p > 0 ∧ w = 0}
ch{1,2}({x1, x2});
if x1 > 0 thenw := 1
else if x2 > 0 thenw := 2
else p := p− 1
{Inv}
Note that in fact, p > 0 is already implied by Inv which means that if Inv is
indeed an invariant, the auction can never terminate due to the price having
reached 0. Hence, for the purposes of verifying the desired equilibrium, the
condition p > 0 is redundant in the guard condition of the while-loop.
To begin with, applying the assignment rule and the if-rule, it is easy to
check that I ⊢
{v1 ≥ v2 > 0 ∧ p ≥ v2 ∧ (x1 > 0→ (o1 = v1 − p ∧ o2 = 0))
∧ ((x1 = 0 ∧ x2 > 0)→ (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − p))
∧ ((x1 = 0 ∧ x2 = 0)→ Inv[p/p− 1])}
if x1 > 0 thenw := 1
else if x2 > 0 thenw := 2
else p := p− 1
{Inv},
where Inv[p/p− 1] results from substituting p− 1 for p in Inv. Denote the new
precondition as Inv2. Now we claim that I ⊢
{v1 ≥ v2 > 0 ∧ p ≥ v2 ∧ w = 0 ∧ (p ≤ v2 → (o1 = v1 − p ∧ o2 = 0))
∧ (p > v2 → (o1 = v1 − v2 ∧ o2 = 0))}
ch{1,2}({x1, x2})
{Inv2}
Assume that v1 ≥ v2 > 0, and consider a state s where p ≥ v2 and w = 0. We
distinguish two cases. First, if p ≤ v2 (i.e., p = v2), both players asking for the
object, i.e., x1 > 0 and x2 > 0, constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the game with
payoffs according to Inv2, with payoffs o1 = v1−p and o2 = 0. Second, suppose
that p > v2. In this case, both players declining the object, i.e., x1 = x2 = 0,
constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Player 2 should not ask for it since the price
exceeds his valuation, and player 1 should not ask for it since the price will
be lower in the next round; formally, declining the object yields o1 = v1 − v2,
whereas demanding the object only yields o1 = v1 − p. Note that here it is
essential that v2 > 0, since it allows us to conclude that also p− 1 > 0, i.e., we
have not reached the last auction round yet, there will be another round with a
lower price.
Denote the new precondition as Inv3. Note that Inv ∧ w = 0 ⊆ Inv3.
Hence, by using the composition rule and the logical consequence rule, we have
established that Inv is indeed an invariant of the loop. Hence, we can apply
the while rule to derive that I ⊢
{Inv}
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while p > 0 ∧ w = 0 do
ch{1,2}({x1, x2});
if x1 > 0 thenw := 1
else if x2 > 0 thenw := 2
else p := p− 1
{Inv ∧ ¬(p > 0 ∧w = 0)}
So to conclude the verification of the Dutch auction, it suffices to note two
things. First, Inv ∧ ¬(p > 0 ∧ w = 0) ⊆ Q, and hence we can apply the logical
consequence rule to obtain the desired postcondition Q. Second, we have I ⊢
{v1 ≥ v2 > 0 ∧ init ≥ v2 ∧ o1 = v1 − v2 ∧ o2 = 0}
p := init;
w := 0
{Inv}
Hence, using the composition rule, we have now shown that I ⊢
{v1 ≥ v2 > 0 ∧ init ≥ v2 ∧ o1 = v1 − v2 ∧ o2 = 0}
p := init;
w := 0;
while p > 0 ∧ w = 0 do
ch{1,2}({x1, x2});
if x1 > 0 thenw := 1
else if x2 > 0 thenw := 2
else p := p− 1
{(w = 1→ (o1 = v1 − p ∧ o2 = 0)) ∧ (w = 2→ (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = v2 − p))
∧ (w = 0→ (o1 = 0 ∧ o2 = 0))}
Note that the verification process has revealed two crucial details which had
to be added to our original precondition P . First, init ≥ v2. This means
that we need to make sure that we start the auction at a price that is high
enough. If the players’ valuations are not known, the choice of the initial price
can indeed be a problem. On the other hand, the condition tells us exactly what
“high enough” means, in particular, the initial price does not need to exceed
everybody’s valuation. Second, v2 > 0. Hence, it does not suffice if only a
single player has a non-zero valuation of the object. The problem here lies in
the fact that in order to obtain the object one has to pay at least something,
and if the other player’s valuation is zero, that something is more than the other
player’s valuation, and hence the payoff is in turn lower than expected. Hence,
we have succeeded in verifying that (α,Q) does indeed implement the social
choice correspondence of section 4.3 associated with the second-price auction,
on condition that init ≥ v2 > 0.
Finally, it should be emphasised again that the weak equivalence of the
Dutch auction and the sealed-bid second-price auction demonstrated here is very
weak indeed, since these auctions are very different. Crucially, in the sealed-
bid second-price auction, a player does not need to know the other player’s
valuation. It suffices that each player submits his own valuation as a bid. In
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the Dutch auction, however, obtaining the same equilibrium outcome requires
the player with the higher valuation to know the valuation of the other player
so that he can decide to shout out just at the right moment. Hence, the two
auctions do not satisfy the same knowledge preconditions. The standard result
concerning the equivalence between Dutch auction and first-price auction does
take these knowledge preconditions into account.
7 Conclusions
Two main directions for future research present themselves: On the founda-
tional side, the question arises whether the present approach can also be ap-
plied to other equilibrium notions. We have already remarked that while the
calculus presented can also be used to reason about Nash equilibria, the non-
compositional nature of these equilibria stands in the way of a complete calculus.
Hence, alternative equilibrium notions that promise to be amenable to our ap-
proach will be refinements of subgame-perfect equilibria. Second, we mentioned
already that an intensional approach to pre- and postconditions is worth devel-
oping. For this, the crucial question is whether the logic used (FOL) and the
expressiveness results obtained for programs can be carried over to mechanisms.
At the most general level, we hope that this paper has shown that tools from
computational logic can be extended from program verification to the verifica-
tion of game-theoretic mechanisms. The examples provided should suffice to
convince the reader of the variety of possible applications of such an extension.
The semantics of the correctness assertions for mechanisms is more complex
than for programs, but this is counterbalanced by the fact that the mechanisms
we would like to verify (e.g., spectrum auctions for telecommunication markets)
may turn out to be simpler than their counterparts in computer software (e.g.,
operating systems).
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